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Summary and policy 
recommendations 
This paper discusses the engagement of the European Investment Bank 
Group (EIB Group) with the financing and support of SMEs, both within 
the European Union (EU) as well as EU Candidate Countries and the 
Balkans. Indeed, lending and providing financial support to SMEs is one 
of the key core objectives of the EIB Group. The main focus of the paper 
is to describe and analyse the practises and experiences of the EIB Group 
in this field, to discuss the key lessons and to make policy 
recommendations to be considered within the Latin America and 
Caribbean (LAC) context. 
The large role played by the EIB Group in financing SMEs in Europe 
shows the significance of the role the public sector needs to, and can, play 
in providing direct financial support to SMEs - as well as helping catalyse 
private financing to them, for example via bank guarantees and other risk-
sharing instruments - given the large market imperfections and g ps in 
private financial markets for SMEs, particularly credit markets. This is the 
case in general, but has become particularly evident in the crisis, where 
the EIB Group has played an important countercyclical role in credit 
provision, in the face of sharply falling private credit to SMEs. It is 
noteworthy that the valuable role that public financial institutions need to 
play has been increasingly recognized since the crisis at the level of 
multilateral development banks (MDBs) and regional development banks 
(RDBs). It is important that similar conclusions are also applied to 
national development banks. 
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I. The role of SMEs in development 
& the issue of access to finance 
A general consensus has emerged in the development community of the 
potential for the SME sector to play a key role in stimulating sustainable 
economic growth and reducing poverty, ultimately contributing to the 
achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This is due 
to their dominance in many developing economies, both as contributors to 
GDP and especially as major providers of employment opportunities1. For 
example, according to some estimates, in the LAC region the SME sector 
contributes approximately 70% of total jobs.2 Growth in the SME sector 
can directly underpin broader gains in GDP, employment and poverty 
reduction as well as deepening the domestic economy. The latter can 
potentially diminish the exposure of an economy to internatiol 
economic cycles by strengthening the domestic economy in sectors which 
have less exposure to international factors including commodity and 
foreign currency markets and to cycles of international private capital 
flows (Ocampo and Griffith-Jones, et al 2010). 
However a number of constraints continue to limit growth in the 
SME sector. Critical factors include a stable macroeconomic and 
institutional environment. Nevertheless, a further key factor is access to 
financing, without which a constraint on continuing existing activities as 
well as new growth and entrepreneurial activities is likely (Beck et al 2008 
Maksimovic, 2006). 
                                                   
1  For example Beck T., Demirguc-Kunt A. and Peria M, (2008) show an average figure of 60% of manufacturing employment is 
based in SMEs in developing countries. 
2  See IFC (2007) ‘Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises: A Collection of Published Data’. 
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World Bank Enterprise Surveys consistently show that access to finance is one of the most 
pervasive obstacles to the growth and development of the SME sector. Available data un use of financial 
services suggest that less than 20% of SMEs in low income countries and about 35% of SMEs in middle 
income countries around the world have a line of credit with a financial institution (Ayyagari, Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt, 2007). Promoting SME access to finance is therefore a key priority for the international 
development community. As a matter of fact, in September 2009 G2  Leaders in Pittsburgh committed 
to improve access to financial services for SMEs. For this purpose, a Financial Inclusion Experts Group 
has been established with the task of scaling up successful modesof SME financing. Amongst its tasks 
will be improving and further quantifying demand-side data for credit SMEs to improve further supply-
side policies including institutional design. 
The main focus of this paper is on SME financing; where relevant we also make reference to 
lending to microenterprises, though this is a somewhat separat rea, often requiring different 
institutions or at least instruments. 
Financing for SMEs can take a number of forms and sources. A basic distinction is between debt 
and equity, with different instruments across these two broad categories. However, the great majority of 
SMEs in all countries depend mostly on bank credit. Debt financing can support working capital as well 
as investment. Different industries have different mixtures of needs across these categories. Access to 
financing includes levels of credit itself, but also adequate cost of funding, the latter being particularly 
critical to SMEs where price sensitivity is high. 
The difficulties that SMEs encounter when trying to access bank credit are due to a number of 
factors. Credit markets in general are characterized by information asymmetries and market 
imperfections. Credit markets for SMEs in particular are characterized by high transaction costs, high 
perception of risk, banks’ limited knowledge and capacity to engage in SME lending, and lack of 
collateral. In addition to this, many SMEs are not able to present bankable business propositions as they 
lack business management skills. All this presents a strong case for public intervention. In particular, 
given their specific mandate MDBs and RDBs, as well as national development banks, can play a key 
role in minimizing market failures and improving SME financing.  
Access to finance for the SME sector becomes even more problematic during periods of recession 
and/or financial crisis. In this context, MDB and RDB counter-cyclical financing is particularly 
important as private credit to SMEs dries up. Indeed there is evidence for the LAC region that during the 
latest crisis large companies, which normally access capital in the in ernational markets, have been 
forced to borrow domestically; as a result, SMEs suffered a double crowding out, because total levels of 
domestic credit fell, and because their share in the total declined. SME lending-and its increase- by 
public institutions, national , regional and multilateral , became particularly crucial. 
1. Overview of the EIB group support for SMEs 
The EIB Group consists of the European Investment Bank (“EIB”) and the European Investment Fund 
(“EIF”) and is a policy-driven public bank. As can be seen in Figure 1 below, EIB direct support for 
SMEs is via lending, mainly thorough Global loans, but also through the Risk Sharing Finance Facility; 
the EIF (owned by the EIB, the European Commission and other parties,(private banks) provides 
participation in equity, mainly gives guarantees, and also gives financial support to 
microenterprises(please see overview of all its instruments in Figure 1; for a detailed description of these 
instruments and activities, see text below) 
The EIB was created in the mid 1950s to support the goals of European integration (see for 
example, Griffith-Jones, Steinherr and Fuzzo,2006, for its main features). Its shareholders are the 27 
member states of the EU and its mandate is to assist in the integration, development and economic and 
social cohesion of EU member countries. The EIB Group also supports convergence in EU candidate 
countries. By financing sound investment, it promotes EU policy objectives. It is the largest MDB in the 
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world by total assets, and has played a key role in European integration, especially by supporting 
investment in infrastructure. 
The EIB is governed independently but receives capital from member governments, who sit on its 
Board. As at December 31st 2009 the EIB Group had over E350 billion in assets and held E164 billion 
in subscribed capital. The EIB raises funds independently in capital markets to finance its operations, 
and is the largest supranational borrower on international capital markets.3 Between 2004 and 2009 the 
EIB borrowed E262 billion including E79 billion in 2009. It holds an AAA credit rating, which allows it 
to fund its operations at relatively low cost so that it can p ss on this benefit to its clients.  
The EIB Group operates on a non-profit basis by leveraging its own resources. In addition to 
these, it manages, particularly through the EIF, a number of mandates on behalf of the European 
Commission. These include use of resources from EU structural funds, which allow financial assistance 
for structural economic and social problems across the EU, includ g regional development. The EIB 
group is very large, and lends more than all the other MDBs and RDBs put together.  
 
FIGURE 1 














Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
The EIB has put SME financing at the centre of its policy for a significant period. The EU’s 23 
million SMEs provide approximately 65% of employment in member countries, giving this sector a 
terrific strategic importance in the context of the EU economic and social policies.4 Supporting SMEs is 
one of the EIB Groups’ operational priorities set out in the EIB 2010-2012 Operational Strategy. In this 
regard, the EIB Group provides long term loans to financial intermediaries for on-lending to SMEs. The 
EIF is the main vehicle for more innovative SME investments and its activities include venture capital 
and guarantees. Further details are given in subsequent sections of this paper. 
                                                   
3  The EIF does not borrow funds and its balance shet is debt-free. However, it has in place a borrowing facility for treasury bridging 
purposes, which may use in the future. 
4  The EU defines SMEs as firms with between 10 and 250 employees; with less than E50 million in sales or less than E43 million in 
total assets (see Recommendation 2003/361/EC). 
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Principle amongst the advantages offered to SMEs by the EIB are av ilability of funds and 
favourable terms, including low interest rates. The EIB and EIF both benefit from an AAA rating and 
Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) status, which enables partner fi ancial institutions to apply a 
zero-percent risk-asset weighting for the purposes of calculating regulatory capital requirements under 
Basel II. This rating is also the key enabler in offering these low interest rates as funding raised by the 
EIB in private capital markets is cheaper and this is then passed on to end user SMEs. 
2. The countercyclical response of the EIB 
The 2008 financial crisis highlighted the highly procyclical nture of private capital flows globally. The 
impact was felt throughout Europe as capital markets suffered from reduced liquidity in both primary 
and secondary markets and investor risk appetite suffered a sharp retr ction. In the light of this, there 
was a request of the EU Finance Ministers in October 2008 to the EIB to significantly increase its 
lending to SMEs to E30bn for 2008-2011 and to front load this increase as part of the European 
Recovery programme.  
Reflecting this, the EIBs Corporate Operational Plan 2009-2011 further strengthens its support to 
SMEs with a very significant increase in target signatures for 2010 vs. 2007 to reach E 11.5bn in 2010. 
The EIB Group responded rapidly to these events by providing an anti-cyclical response in banking and 
capital markets, including those for SMEs. Overall the EIB group rapidly expanded lending in 2009, as 
did other MDBs, including the World Bank Group. EIB’s capit l was increased by E67bn to support the 
necessary expansion of its balance sheet. 
 
TABLE 1 
EIB LENDING APPROVALS, SIGNATURES AND DISBURSEMENTS  TO SMEs 
(EURO BILLION), 2007-2009 
Euro Bn 2007 2008 2009  
Approvals 5.8 8.4 15.1 
Signatures 5.7 8.2 12.7 
Disbursements 6.4 5.6 10.1 
Source: EIB Annual Report 2007, 2008 and 2009. EIB data. 
 
TABLE 2 
OVERVIEW OF EIF SME OUTSTANDING EXPOSURE AT 2008 & 2009 
 As at Dec. 2008 
(Ebn) 
As at Dec. 2008 
(percentage) 
As at Dec. 2009 
(Ebn) 
As at Dec. 2009 
(percentage) 
EIF Guarantee Exposure 12.3 78 13.6 77 
EIF Private Equity Assets  3.5 22 4.1 23 
EIF Total Portfolio 15.8 100 17.7 100 
Source: EIF Annual report 2008 & 2009; EIB Annual Report 2008. 
 
In fact, the de facto increase was NOT ONLY VERY LARGE, but even BIGGER THAN 
PLANNED with impressive growth of EIB signatures for lending to SMEs of 128% between 2007 and 
2009, and growth of disbursements of 57% in the same period. (see table 2). The proportion of EIB 
SME lending in the total EIB lending went up significantly from 14.6% in 2008 to 19.1% in 2009. 
Furthermore, EIB lending to SMEs in the new member countries, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe 
increased even more. The EIB estimated that the additional private sector finance leveraged by its loans 
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was at least a multiple of 2 in the case of SMEs, which was similar, though slightly lower, to the 
leverage of private finance for total EIB lending.  
It is interesting that the significant increase in lending to SMEs was made possible by the fact that 
there was no capital constraint at the time for increased lending, as the capital of the EIB had been 
significantly increased in previous years. An important lesson here for Latin America is that RDBs and 
even national development banks should be well capitalized, so they have room for quick lending 
expansion if the economy deteriorates. This prevents lengthy dela s before increases in capital are 
agreed. Great efforts by EIB Management and staff, as well as greater fl xibility in some of the previous 
EIB rules, such as most importantly lifting all restrictions on additional lending for working capital 
linked to investment, as well as reducing the amount of detailed information that needs to be provided, 
were also important factors for facilitating this countercyclical rapid increase of lending. By fortunate 
coincidence, the EIB, after consulting its users, had been designing changes to its SME lending, to make 
it simpler, more flexible and transparent, when the crisis hit, so it accelerated its implementation. 
On the demand side, by banks, there was an important increase, particularly since the second half 
of 2008. Thus, reportedly, many EU banks had not expressed in the past an interest in obtaining funding 
from the EIB for SME lending, as they could easily fund themselves in the inter-bank markets. But when 
the crisis hit, most banks saw their sources of funding shrink dramatically and went to the EIB 
requesting such loans. As a result now many more European banks h ve lines of credit for SMEs from 
the EIB, and reportedly are likely to keep using them and requesting new ones(interview material). The 
geographical coverage of the EIB lending to intermediaries increased significantly, as result of the crisis. 
Thus, in 2007, banks in 16 of 27 EU countries had SME credit lines with the EIB and in 2009, this 
number increased from 16 to 24! For example the banks of the Nordic countries, that had never used 
these credit lines started to use them. 
Equity activity however was more procyclical with a decrease of 21% from 2007 to 2008, 
although this then made a strong recovery to above 2007 levels in 2009.(see table 2). Part of the initial 
decline in equity was in relation to a reduction in own risk lending as risk management concerns led to a 
contraction of risk appetite. 
The focus of EIB lending to SMEs is loans to financial intermediaries for their on-lending to 
SMEs(see again table 1); there is no restriction of the type of SMEs to which they should lend, (except 
to forbidden sectors like arms), nor is there an aim of particularly supporting technologically innovative 
SMEs. The aim is rather to help finance SMEs in general. The focus ver a long period by the EIB on 
SME financing has given it a great depth of experience and expertise in the field and makes it a useful 
model to examine in considering lessons for other regions. For example, the EIB has a reputation for 
careful selection of and monitoring of financial intermediaries. However, in this type of more “plain 
vanilla lending” the EIB is somewhat similar to other Regional development banks, though its 
commitment to SME lending is particularly strong, its experience very positive and it has created some 
innovations, especially recently. Amongst recent innovations introduced by the EIB itself in its lending 
for SMEs, it has started to introduce risk sharing mechanisms, whereby the financial intermediary shares 
the risk – and reward- with the EIB of the portfolio of SME loans; this can be done as sharing first loss 
or by the intermediary assuming risks on a slice of the portfoli . Because these innovations are recent, 
only few transactions have as yet been made, and it has not yet been evaluated. As we discuss in detail 
below, the greater innovations for SME lending are via the EIF. 
The EIB has three de-facto conditions for allocating resources to financial intermediaries 
(especially banks), which it monitors carefully. They are: 1) additionality, 2) transfer of information to 
SMEs and 3) Transfer of financial advantage. 
As regards additionality, the EIB requirement is tapered, and increases for larger investment 
projects, above Euro 12.5 million. For projects below E12.5 million, the EIB can provide up to 100% of 
the investment. For loans above E12.5 million, the maximum EIB loan is that amount, with a minimum 
ratio of 50% of EIB lending to total investment. 
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To ensure that credit lines are used, 60% of loans by the EIB have to be allocated to SMEs by the 
financial intermediary , reported to the EIB and agreed by the EIB(which basically checks that the 
activities of SMEs are not excluded ones -eg for arms purchases) before a new loan to the financial 
intermediary can be considered. 
In relation to transfer of information, the bank is required to inform the SME that the loans are 
partly funded by the EIB.  
In relation to transfer of financial advantage, the intermediary bnk must transfer the advantage of 
borrowing cheaper resources from the EIB, given the EIB’s AAA rating. The transfer of financial 
advantage, in the case of countries with less developed financial markets, -such as pre accession 
countries -is mainly transferred via an extension of maturities that tend to be short in those countries. For 
banks in those countries, reducing their maturity mismatches, (with EIB lending typically reaching 10 
years maturity, in contrast to much shorter term funding they can obtain from their depositors or on the 
interbank market), is extremely valuable. Furthermore, reduction of mismatches, has advantages for 
overall financial stability in those countries. 
For most countries within the EU, long term loans, eg 7 years are typically available. The transfer of 
financial advantage is related to the cost of lending; this can be done via a reduction of interest payments or 
by an upfront straight payment by the bank to the SME, equivalent to the net present value of what the bank 
is saving. The bank then reports on this transfer of financial advantage to the EIB, which monitors it. As 
regards calculation of the financial advantage by the EIB, this is a difficult task, as there are information 
asymmetries, implying for example that EIB does not know exactly what the cost of funding of banks 
lending to SMEs is; the EIB therefore bases itself on estimates, and then negotiates with the financial 
intermediary what the financial advantage is, based on its estimates, on a reasonable sharing of this 
advantage, to allow for bank to cover their cost of dealing with the EIB, and a reasonable profit from the 
transaction for the bank. This stops or limits financi l intermediaries free riding on EIB resources. 
3. EIB Group policy and instruments in support of S MEs 
In terms of instruments, the main focus of the EIB Group’s lending to SMEs is on loans to financial 
intermediaries for their on-lending to SMEs, which was discus ed in detail above . 
In addition to loans to financial intermediaries, the EIB also supports access to debt financing for 
high technology SMEs in conjunction with the EU through its Risk Sharing Finance Facility. The facility 
is project-based and its aim is to support initiatives in the high-risk segment of research, innovation and 
technological development. The facility is built on the principle of risk sharing between the EU and the 
EIB. It has E2 billion capital, EUR 1bn from the EIB and the same amount from the EC under the 7th 
Research Framework Programme (2007-2013), enabling the EIB to lend more than E10 billion for this 
kind of investment. By mid-2010 already E6 billion had been committed. However, SMEs are not the 
only beneficiaries, which also include special purpose companies, public- rivate partnerships and joint 
ventures, research institutes, universities and science and technology parks. 
As well as through lines of credit to financial intermediaries, the EIB Group provides financial 
support to SMEs with other products. The main vehicle in this case is the EIF. (see again Figure 1)The 
EIF is a specialized fund of funds dedicated exclusively to SMEs. It has a tripartite shareholding 
structure, comprising the EIB (64%), the EU through the EC (27%) and a number of financial 
institutions (9% in aggregate). The EC in particular plays a specific role. Not only was it the main driver 
behind the creation of the EIF, it also largely sets the developmental objectives to which the EIF is 
institutionally committed. The EIF represents the most important platform for SME projects from the EU 
budget, providing expertise and at the same time ensuring efficiency n the use of EU budget resources. 
Like with its parent company, EIF financing is also made exclusively via intermediaries with a financial 
participation usually capped at 50%.The use of portfolio guarantees remains the principal vehicle and 
instrument for EIF lending to SMEs with 77% of its total 2009 year end exposures being in this form. 
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These also include credit enhancements for securitization structures yet this kind of financing has largely 
been on hold since the financial crisis of 2008. Finally, the EIF provides venture capital including equity, 
mezzanine and other equity or quasi-equity financing. Under these operations, the EIF acts as a fund of 
funds, taking equity investment in private equity funds. In addition to its own-risk resources, EIF’s 
financing is made under mandates managed on behalf of the EC as well as of third parties, which 
represent the larger proportion of its business. Approximately, two-thirds of the guarantee business and 
ninety-percent of venture capital commitments fall within this category. In return for managing 
portfolios under mandates, The EIF receives a management fee and, for venture capital activities, a 
performance fee.  
BOX1 
KEY FEATURES OF THE EIB GROUP SME POLICY  
Definition and uses of financing: 
• Policy Consistency: Required to be consistent with EU policy goals 
• Size thresholds to define SMEs 
• Long term financing: Minimum 2 year maturity with no maximum 
• Working capital: Limited to minimum 2 year requirement, modified recently due to special needs arising from 
the crisis 
• Tangible & non-tangible assets can be financed 
• Equity focused on high technology & innovative technology start ups 
Financing mechanisms: 
• Top instruments: Direct lending and guarantees 
• All funds through financial intermediaries 
• Use of segregated legal entities and fund of fund structures 
• Technical assistance provided 
• New innovations in instruments and risk taking: Introduction of equity and mezzanine financing ncluding own 
risk funding 
Source: Authors elaboration based in EIB information. 
 
In the guarantee business, the EIF manages on behalf of the EC the ompetitiveness and 
Innovation Program (CIP), which covers the period 2007-2013. This is a program which aims to ease 
SME access to finance in order to foster growth, productivity enhancements and innovation among EU 
small businesses. The CIP has replaced the Multi Annual Program fo  Enterprise and Entrepreneurship, 
which expired in 2006. Of a total E3.6 billion budgeted for the program, the EIF manages E1.1 billion 
under two facilities: the SME Guarantee Facility (SMEGF) and the High Growth and Innovative SME 
Facility (GIF). Up to 50% of the resources are earmarked for guarantees, with the remainder focusing on 
equity and microfinance. Under the CIP, the EC guarantees the first loss on SME portfolio of financial 
institutions. The CIP covers EU member countries, EU candidte countries and the Balkans and Turkey.  
For venture capital investment, apart from using its own capital and resources from the CIP, the EIF 
manages the Risk Capital Mandate (RCM) on behalf of its parent company, the EIB. The RCM facility is 
worth E4 billion and has been operated since 2000, when the EIF became responsible for all EIB Group 
equity investments in the EU. The RCM represents the largest source of venture capital investments run by 
the EIF. In addition, the EIF manages joint investment facilities based on third-party mandates, either from 
public or private resources. For example, the EIF manages third-party mandates with funds-of-funds 
established on the initiative of partners located in Germany, Spain, Portugal and Turkey.  
The EIF has also been implementing the JEREMIE (Joint European Resources for Micro to 
Medium Enterprises) initiative to facilitate SME access to finance i  those regions eligible for the use of 
EU structural funds. Under this initiative, EU member states nd regions are able to use part of their 
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structural funds through the EIF to allocate these funds to more efficiently support SMEs. Finally, the 
EIF is implementing JASMINE (Joint Action to Support Microfinance Institutions in Europe), a new EU 
initiative promoted by the EC which aims to develop microcredit for those micro-entrepreneurs excluded 
from the banking sector. (see figure 1)The EIB has already allocated E20 million through the RCM, 
while technical assistance will be financed by the EC. Overall, the facility is expected to pool E50 
million, with other financiers expected to contribute.  
4. Summary of policy recommendations 
As noted, the EIB and EIF have extensive experience in SME financing developed in the context of the 
EU and based in the EIBs relationship with the EU. In considering how to leverage the EIB experiences 
there are a number of key areas that could be directly utilised within LAC and further areas that, with 
modification and adaption to the context of LAC, also provide useful models. In some instance however 
we would recommend caution and de-emphasis of certain aspects of EIB practise.  
Firstly, as noted, the EIB anti-cyclical policy is strong and we would recommend application of it 
in the LAC context. This is especially the case as both SMEs and developing countries have significant 
pro-cyclical private sector capital flows and domestic finance. We note that the IADB also implemented 
excellent anti-cyclical responses. However we would recommend additional policy such as “crisis 
planning” to provide automatic capital extensions, creating lending that incorporates “stickiness” of 
financing with intermediaries or co-investors in the private sector and flexible co-financing arrangements 
that provide anti-cyclical expansion by MDBs.  
Secondly, we strongly recommend a focus on replicating the EIBspolicy of direct lending and 
guarantees of lending5 to financial intermediaries with co-financing and pass through of cheap funding 
costs. The CIP guarantee experience, described below, is particularly inte esting. Key aspects of this 
policy that make this approach attractive include co-financing to crowd in the private sector, use of 
intermediaries to enable low interest rates for end users and using intermediaries to gain scale and local 
expertise. In addition, the appropriate risk management for suchinstruments uses existing internal 
expertise and infrastructure within MDBs.  
Conversely we recommend a cautious approach to replication of complex financial structuring 
techniques and higher leverage financial instruments including securitizations, including their guarantee, 
mezzanine debt, equity and venture capital co-investments as well as complex legal entity structuring. 
Although these instruments can play important roles in financi g SMEs, particularly in crowding in the 
private sector and in filling market gaps in higher risk financing such as in high technology research and 
development, the advantages in the LAC context need to be clear and outweigh the potential 
disadvantages. The latter include the potential to create systematic risk in the financial sector, including 
lowering of transparency and increasing pro-cyclical flows, and the need for both highly complex risk 
management as well as the risk of losses on impairments and write downs.  
One example where we believe the advantages outweigh the potential disadvantages in the LAC 
context however is the support of technical innovation and in particular we discuss the replication of the 
EIF policy of support and financing of high technology “clusters” in partnership with universities 
although we would place greater emphasis on government rather than priv te sector partnerships.  
However following these recommendations raised the issue that EIB policies rely on EU funding. 
In particular the CIP program which funds much of the guarantee program uses EU funds to cover 
expected losses. The EIB also benefits from the support of the EU in its credit rating and hence its cost 
of funds which enables it to pass through cheaper interest rat to end users. We would recommend 
consideration of how such funding and support can be replaced in LAC. For example grants or ODA 
                                                   
5  Which are already active areas in LAC but not necessarily through intermediaries, use co-financing or have pass through of cheap 
funding costs. 
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could be appropriate sources for LAC especially in low income countries; national budgets would 
probably be the best source for middle income countries. 
In addition we recommend an examination of supportive policies such as provision of technical 
advice and engagement in a deeper assessment of demand-side constraints for SMEs both as part of the 
global initiatives currently in progress and independently within the region including at a country by 
country level. 
These policy recommendations are discussed in more detail in Section III of this paper. 
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II. Detail on EIB group 
SME financing 
As discussed in the introduction, the EIB Group supports SMEs through a 
number of products and instruments, with its own resources as well as 
under mandates managed on behalf of the EC and third-parties. Th EIF 
represents the main vehicle for SME projects using the EU budget 
resources, providing guarantees, venture capital and, more recently, 
assistance for microfinance institutions. However, more traditional lending 
via financial intermediaries and on a larger scale is done by the EIB itself, as 
discussed above. Figure 1 in the prior section summarizes the EIB Group 
support for SMEs. The following sections describe in more detail the main 
facilities used by the EIB Group to ease SME access to finance. 
1. Direct lending 
The EIB makes loans directly to commercial banks for SME financig. 
Available since 2008 the target is to lend E30bn in the 2008-11 periods 
with over E20bn lent by 2009. As noted key advantages are the financing 
itself as well as the low interest rates which are passed on to end us rs. 
The structure of these loans is relatively simple and details of the policy 
elements have been discussed in Section I. However by volume these 
loans are very important to the financing of the sector and are a major 
contribution by the EIB.  
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2. Guarantees 
Guarantees represent a major instrument for supporting SME access to finance in the EU and Candidate 
countries. Guarantees, which include partial loan portfolio guarantees and “wrappers” for SME 
securitizations, are provided by the EIF, and account for its largest exposure at 77% of its 2009 year end 
exposure. Guarantees are backed by EU mandates or provided by the EIF on an own-risk basis.  
During the 2007-08 crisis risk aversion was high at the EIF and this resulted in a sharp fall in 
activity in 2007, but a quick recovery in 2008. These points are illustrated in figure 4 below. This initial 
pro-cyclical response, followed by a clear countercyclical one is discussed in Part III of this paper.  
 
TABLE 3 
EIF ANNUAL GUARANTEE COMMITMENTS 2006-2009 a 
Euro millions 2006 2007 2008 2009 
European Commission (MAP & CIP) 1 028.2 8.0 1 308.7 2 224.3 
EIF Own Resources 1 194.3 1 397.2 834.2 0.0 
Total 2 222.5 1 397.2 2 142.9 2 224.3 
Source: EIF Annual Report 2008 & 2009. 
a During 2007 the SMEGF under CIP was being finalised and MAP unwound and so EC funds were largely inactive. 
Due to the market condition there were no own risk signatures in 2009. 
 
In addition the majority of EIF Guarantees are to developed countries with 91% to EU27 
countries and most of the remaining 9% to Central and Eastern European countries. This is illustrated in 
figure 5 below. Total lending outside of the EU27 totals E0.7bn or 9% of the total and is mainly to 
Central & Eastern European countries. Poland and Czech Republic, some of the more mature economies 
in this group, are major recipients in this region with minor funds going to Bulgaria, Latvia, Romania 
and Hungary. In assessing relevance of EIF policy for developing countries this is again discussed 
further in Part III of this paper.  
FIGURE 2 
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The guarantees cover two main categories. The first are loan guarantees which cover portfolios of 
SME medium to long term financing. This is seen as the core activity and as noted focuses on crowding 
in additional private sector financing to the SME sector. The EIF offers direct primary guarantees and 
counter guarantees (or “wrappers”) to primary guarantors of similar portfolios. 
The majority of guarantees are offered through the CIP, a very innovative mechanism. CIP 
guarantees are offered as partial guarantees and incorporate capped first losses which are shared between 
the EIF and the financial intermediary ensuring an avoidance of moral hazard and crowding in of the 
private sector. The EIF’s internal estimate of leverage created by CIP guarantees is fifteen, giving a 
highly effective tool for increasing SME financing.  
The CIP provides funds which are used to “fund” a proportion of expected losses on the portfolio 
guaranteed (typically these are 5-10% of the value of the loans, but omewhat higher for micro finance). 
Expected losses are calculated using an EIF model of expected losses for different portfolios of loans, 
based on long series of historical data including on default rtes and recovery rates. Although the models 
used are internal to the EIF they conform to the industry standards, including those used by rating 
agencies. However, according to EIF sources they seem to have worked better. 
Guarantees are provided free of charge under the SMEGF in the context of CIP, which is funded 
by budgetary contributions from the EC under the CIP 2007-2013 programme and managed by the EIF 
of behalf of the EC. The budgetary funds available for covering these first losses are considerable, 
reaching E550 million and applying the multiplier of 15 gives increased lending to SMEs of over E8bn. 
Once these funds for covering first losses are used up, they are expected to be replenished in the next 
period. Commitment fees may be charged in some very exceptional circumstances, when the guarantee 
is not used. Normally, there is no guarantee fee, which allows the bank to lend more, to more risky 
SMEs and to new segments, and/or reduce spreads charged. 
In addition, financing under SMEGF is provided only on incremental lending. To ensure that 
there is incremental funding, the guarantee only becomes operational once the financial intermediary 
passes a certain level of lending above its previous lending. This implies more lending than otherwise 
would take place. Operationally this is done by assessing a “normal” level of lending for each 
intermediary and then the guarantee is triggered when additional lending level above this threshold is 
executed. This ensures that guarantees stimulate additional lending, ot risk reduction on existing or 
planned SME lending for the intermediary.  
Prior to the crisis only medium or long term financing to SMEs was eligible to receive guarantee. 
However as part of the anti-cyclical responses by the EIB Group to the crisis, working capital if linked to 
investment became eligible for financing as well.  
The CIP experience seems to offer valuable lessons for SME lending i  LAC, but there would be 
a need for budgetary funds to be provided. 
In addition to loan guarantees the EIF also provides credit enhancement for securitizations of 
SME portfolios. The key objective is to facilitate capital market access for unrated or low rated 
institutions. These include, for example, small local or natiol banks. Cash and synthetic securitizations 
are covered and a number of guarantee instruments are offered including note holders wrappers, credit 
default swaps and bilateral guarantees. The guarantee covers a maximum of 50% of the first loss (equity) 
tranche and 100% for mezzanine or more senior tranches. The majority of EIF guarantees are for 
mezzanine tranches. Front-end fees and commitment fees are charged.  
Prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the European market for SME securitizations had been 
growing steadily with volumes of E170m annually, expanding geographically as well as in term of asset 
classes.6 Up to 2007 the EIF participated in 5% of the total market in SME issuances and 15-20% of 
mezzanine issuances. Since the crisis however, the market has been severely impacted with no issuances 
                                                   
6 Source:http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTECAREGTOPPRVSECDEV/Resources/5709541211578683837/Tappi_EIF_EIFs_ 
approach.pdf. 
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in 2008 and 2009 and a very tentative return to issuance in 2010. It remains to be seen if liquidity will 
return to the securitization market. Therefore any introduction of securitization mechanisms to finance 
SMEs in LAC should be very carefully evaluated , not least due to its highly procyclical nature. This is 
discussed in more detail in Section III. 
BOX 2 
AN EXAMPLE SECURITIZATION TRANSACTION: ROOF POLAND I-III 
• 2006 securitization of E167m Polish SME lease receivables. 
• Receivables originated by a SME lease financier who was able to add further assets for 3 years and was thus 
able to recycle all the original funds back into SME financing. 
• EIB purchased E50m of senior notes and the EIF proved credit enhancement through guaranteeing E8.6m of 
the mezzanine tranche.  
• Other participants and arrangers were commercial banks.  
• Transacted via ROOF Poland SPV with “true sale” status. 
Source: Authors elaboration based in EIB information. 
 
As noted, the EIF deals exclusively via intermediaries. The EIF assesses the financial 
intermediaries’ capabilities and capacity in evaluating and managing the SME portfolio but does not 
assess or manage the SME end-users directly. This assessment is an important part of risk management 
and is again discussed further in Part III. 
3. Equity 
In addition to guarantee transactions, the EIB Group is active in equity transactions through the EIF. 
Typically they take the form of minority stakes with co-investors in the private sector. There is a focus on 
high growth and innovative SMEs who find private sector financing limited due to the risky nature of their 
activities. Funding is largely through EU dedicated funds but also through the EIFs own resources. (see 
table 4 for details). 56% of funds are though Venture Capital funds. Again the focus geographically is 
within the EU 27 representing 82% of exposure with the remainder mainly in Eastern & Central Europe. 
 
TABLE 4 
EIF ANNUAL EQUITY SIGNATURES 2006 TO 2009 
Euro millions 2006 2007 2008 2009 
EIF own resources 74.5 70.7 19.2 42.7 
EIB Risk Capital Mandate 482.7 379.4 187.6 362.6 
EIB Mezzanine Facility for Growth 0.0 0.0 0.0 159.9 
European Commission 89.4 49.7 134.3 43.4 
Regional Mandates 41.4 21.0 43.6 50.0 
Fund of funds 0.0 3.6 24.2 50.0 
Non-European Union 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.5 
Total 687.9 524.3 408.9 731.1 
Source: EIF Annual Report 2008 & 2009. 
 
The major source of funds for equity signatures is the RCM and the new 2009 Mezzanine Finance 
Facility, the latter part of the anti-cyclical responses by the EIB. These programs are funded mandates 
from the EU. The decline in EIF own-resources in 2008 and only partial recovery in 2009 reflects the 
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risk aversion in both the EIB and its partners in the private sector during the financial crisis. However, 
total equity signatures were by 2009 higher than any year since 2006, which shows an encouraging 
recovery. 
The majority of exposure relates to the earliest stages of the life-cycle of an SME with seed to 
expansion representing 55% of the 2009 portfolio with the majority of this being in start up and early 
stage SMEs. Given that this is where market gaps are highest due to the risky nature of many projects 
this is an especially valuable role for MDBs, RDBs and at a country level for public development banks 
(see table 5). A significant portion of such early lifecycle financing is provided to venture capital funds. 




EIF OUTSTANDING EQUITY EXPOSURES BY RISK CATEGORY ( SEE FIGURE 4 FOR EXPLANATION 
OF “LIFE-CYCLE” SHOWING “EQUITY STAGES”) 






Venture Capital (Seed to Expansion) 1 966 56 2 254 55 
Lower Mid-Market (Growth, Small Cap & Mid Market) 1 189 34 1 459 40 
Fund of Funds & Special Structures 381 10 402 5 
TOTAL  3 536 100 4 103 100 
Source: EIF Annual Report 2008. 
 
Total equity risk outside of the EU27 amounts to E0.2 bn or 13% of the total and is mainly to 
Central & Eastern European countries. This includes E104m of risk in Turkey which includes a 
specialist fund-of-funds, Istanbul Venture Capital, Initiative where the EIF act as advisor and co-investor 
with private sector banking investors (see figure 3).  
 
FIGURE 3 













Source: EIF Annual Report 2009. 
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A particularly interesting area of venture capital products, mainly in the EU, includes equity 
stakes to facilitate developing the results of research and development into marketable products and 
services. This includes collaboration between research organizations and industry, licensing and 
development of intellectual property rights and start-ups including university spin-offs. Box 3 provides a 
discussion of these partnerships.  
This experience of equity stakes to facilitate technological innovation nd its dissemination seems 
of great interest for the LAC region. 
BOX 3 
AN EXAMPLE VENTURE CAPITAL FUND: 360 CAPITAL PARTNE RS 
• Pan European private sector venture capital firm. 
• Manages E200m+ of investments in 60+ companies. 
• Focus on high technology start-ups. 
Source: Authors elaboration based in EIB information. 
 
Historically the EIF has focused on early stage high technology sector and on regional or 
European funds but recently has sought greater diversification by balancing these early stage 
investments with expansion into more diverse sectors and later st ge mid-market financing. The latter 
includes mezzanine financing and is completed via a dedicated fund, the Mezzanine Facility for Growth 
which in April 2009 was approved with funding of E1bn. Mezzanine debt can be used for expansion or 
reorganization of mature businesses and late stage technology companies.  
 
BOX 4 
THE EIF AND UNIVERSITY CO-INVESTMENTS 
The EIF have partnered with a number of the top ranked universities in the EU to provide an incubator for 
development and commercialization of cutting edge research. The EIF provide a continuity of funding for the projects 
throughout their life-cycle from initial concept to full commercialization and by doing so contributes to the development 
of high techs sectors in the EU. Typical investment include a “umbrella” fund which manages a portfolio of various 
projects, some of which are in specialist fields. Such an approach also ensures appropriate diversification of risk across 
a range of these speculative projects. Examples of 2 such funds are given below. 
Example (1) Karolinska Development Co-Investment Fu nd (KCIF) 
• Karolinska Institute in Sweden is a very high ranking medical university & is linked to Karolinska Development  
(KD) is which brings medical related very early projects to “proof of concept“ and into development. 
• The EIF has made a E26.7m investment into the EUR 36.1m KCIF CoInvestment Fund KB (KCIF)  
• The portfolio comprises 45 life science companies with 19 potential “first-in class“ compounds, ten companies 
with 12 clinical-phase projects, of which seven compounds in Phase II clinical trials. Therapeutic areas include 
cardiovascular, oncology, dermatology and wound healing. 
Example (2) UMIP Premier Fund 
• Fund dedicated to commercialization of technology developed in research at the University of Manchester  
which has a “5-star” rated academic research department. 
• UMIP is separate university owned technology transfer company who selected investments & partners with MTI 
an investment manager. 
• Focus is late seed investments with 15-20 companies and investments in £250-£750k range and a maximum 
follow up investment of £3m. 
• Investments to date have included (i) “Power Oasis” a telecom power provider for locations with limited network 
gird reliability; (ii) Apatech, a provider of synthetic bone graft material with MTI assisting the company in 
adoption by leading surgeons; and (ii) Exosect, a producer of environmentally friendly pesticides. 
Source: Authors elaboration based in EIB information. 
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4. Jeremie 
JEREMIE is the “Joint European Resources for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises”, a Joint venture of 
EIB, EU and EIF to promote financing and a wider range of financial products to SMEs in the EU via 
financial intermediaries. It is implemented by the EIF. Under JEREMIE national and regional authorities 
can direct funds from EU structural funds to SMEs. Structual f nds represent one third of all EU funds 
for development and were previously used as direct grants.  
Multiple instruments are used with differing risk profiles including equity and mezzanine 
financing as well as loans and guarantees. As in this case grants p ovided by the EU structural funds are 
not used to cover losses, funds are returned to the holding fund on maturity for recycling. This has the 
advantage of greater leverage of these funds and the benefits of revolving funds. In addition co-financing 
from the private sector is sought. Both of these factors increase significantly the funds available in terms 
of the end level of funding to SMEs.  
JEREMIE was established in stages with an initial evaluation stage  in 2006-07, including an 
analysis of supply and demand gaps and market failures for credit, by country and type of SME activity. 
Particularly important in this aspect was that the EIF, jointly with the EC, as well as relevant countries 
carried out a SME finance gap analysis in the 2005-2008 period. This mapping of needs was very useful 
for countries, regardless of whether they adopted JEREMIE or established similar independent national 
funds. Based on this careful analysis, recommendations were made for countries to establish revolving 
funds to finance SMEs; within this they could chose to do either through JEREMIE and the EIF or their 
own funds. Such detailed mapping exercises could be very useful for LAC countries, where they are not 
available, as a basis for SME lending policy. 
The funding and management structure of JEREMIE are illustrated in figure 4 below. After 
agreement with the national government, the EU structural funds or other sources of co-financing (e.g. 
from national funds or third parties) are placed into a designated “holding fund” managed by the EIF. 
The legal entity of this holding fund can be either a segregated legal entity (i.e. a special purpose 
vehicle) or a simpler “ring fenced” pool of assets (e.g. a trust or designated bank account) depending 
upon the level of sophistication required and the respective national legal framework.  
Under JEREMIE, the EIF is then delegated responsibility for a number of management tasks 
including, typically, the selection and management of financial intermediaries, setting criteria for 
appraising and making investments and monitoring and reporting functions with the chosen financial 
intermediaries. Funds are then lent to intermediaries for on-lending to the end-user SMEs. The relevant 
national authority participates in the “investment board”, which sets higher level strategy and decision-
making for the holding fund. 
Financial intermediaries are selected on the basis of a submitted business plan which includes 
review of management, efficiency and outreach to SMEs. Financial intermediaries considered include a 
wide range of SME financiers such as banks, guarantee funds, venture capital funds, loan funds, and 
technology transfer vehicles and microfinance operators.  
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FIGURE 4 









Source: Authors elaboration. 
 
From 2007 JEREMIE became operational and sought mandates from a number of countries, 
established offices in countries and, after a call of interest, started the selection of financial intermediaries. 
By the end of 2009, 10 agreements signed with E704m of agreed funding. These include signed mandates 
with Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia with over E600m of dedicated funds to be funded with 65% 
debt and 35% equity. Most of the activity is thus in Central and Eastern Europe, but they are also active in 
EU countries like Italy and France which have execut d regional programs under JEREMIE.  
TABLE 6 
JEREMIE MANDATES 2007 TO 2009 
  2007 2008 2009 
Mandates Number 1 6  10 
Fund Agreements Signed Euro Millions 100.0 604.0 1 082.7 
Source: EIF Annual Report 2008 & 2009. 
 
However alternative mixed approaches were adopted by other countries wi h JEREMIE forming a 
part of their SME strategy alongside nationally managed funds. For example Hungary entered 
discussions with the EIF but decided to setup their own national and independent fund, the “Venture 
Capital Hungry plc”. Hungry already had a maturing network of SME financing assistance, largely 
under the umbrella organization of the Hungarian Development Bank(“HDB”). In recent comment by 
the Hungarian Ministry for National Development and Economy (5) it was noted that JEREMIE value 
lay in the range of instruments and its ability to respond t  market gaps and new market segments but 
that Hungary has however engaged the EIB in other forms of SME financing. For example in May 2009 
the EIB itself provided a E40m loan to be redistributed to SME via the commercial bank, Erste Group 
Hungry (Part of a E440m loan to the Erste Group in CEE). 
Similarly Poland has undertaken a number of actions to support and develop its SME sector and 
these have included more sophisticated financing through CIP and m rket based securitization, which 
has involved support and participation of the EIF. For example Poland and the EIF had a facility under 
the Multiannual Programme (“MAP”), the CIPs predecessor, which was renewed in January 2010 under 
a 3-year guarantee agreement under CIP. Bank BPH is a co-guarantor in the facility with the EIF, as it 
had been for MAP. Bank BPH is a commercial bank whose parent is GE Capital and which specialised 
in innovative financing for Polish SMEs. The program provides guarantees of up to E150m to new and 
existing SMEs. They include lending for working capital, and longer term investment funding. In 
relation to JEREMIE, Poland undertook extensive discussions relating to establishing a JEREMIE 
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national basis. However, a lack of clarity on the legal framework as a key barrier to direct participation 
and subsequently the Ministry of Regional Development then setup an independent venture capital fund-
of-funds with a holding fund manager and E200m portfolio f equity instruments. EIF have provided 
training and advisory work to the fund-of-fund in a limited capacity during setup. 
Such examples from specific middle income countries indicate that a program like JEREMIE may 
not be suitable for all countries and highlights alternatives. In particular, for those middle income 
countries with SME financing markets that are relatively sophisticated JEREMIE may offer fewer 
advantages both in terms of financing and technical advice.  
However for those countries with less developed national agencies and less mature financial 
markets the advantages of JEREMIE is an important contribution and can be a key model for applying in 
Latin America. In particular JEREMIE provides a range of instruments for end user SMEs that reflect 
the full “life-cycle” (See figure 18) of early stage to mature SMEs with requirements for equity, 
developing into mezzanine debt and finally lending and guarantees. In addition, the ability of the 
JEREMIE program to provide advantages to intermediaries in the form of, again, this full range of 
instruments, plus leverage and ability to recycle funds throug securitization are key enabling factors for 
the participating intermediaries. The ability of JEREMIE to pr vide and risk manage this range of 
instruments in markets where other participants, both public and private, maybe find such risk 
management difficult or unpalatable are important advantages of the JEREMIE approach. In addition the 
strong emphasis on technical advice ensures the best opportunities for SMEs in the program to be 
successful in their business. Where the circumstance of public and private participants to provide these 
directly is lacking, a replication of a JEREMIE style program would be a possible model to fill these 
important market gaps.  
5. Jasmine 
Launched as a pilot project in 2007, JASMINE (Joint Action t  Support Microfinance Institutions in 
Europe) is a joint program between the EC, the EIB and the EIF. JASMINE has been created to support 
microfinance institutions in order to facilitate financing of those micro-enterprises which are normally 
excluded from the banking sector. Like JEREMIE, JASMINE is implemented by the EIF.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the main focus of this study is on SME financing; however, 
given the interesting features of JASMINE and the potential for replication in other regions, including 
LAC, a brief description is offered below.  
TABLE 7 
SUMMARY OF JASMINE ACTIVITY 2008 TO 2009 
  2008 2009 
Mandates Number of mandates 1 1 
Fund Agreements Signed Euro Millions 1.8 1.8 
Technical Assistance Number on institutions 0 15 
Source: EIF Annual Report 2008 & 2009. 
 
JASMINE represents a pilot project in the microfinance industry, and to date only one mandate 
has been signed. However the EIF plans to expand this program, particularly in EU member states, as 
part of their anti-cyclical responses to support economic activity and employment. Financial support is 
provided for those MFIs that are in development or in the process of becoming self sustaining. In 
addition technical support is provided by the EC. Only one inv stment has been signed under JASMINE 
to date, an E1.8m commitment to CoopEst, as well as 15 technical assistance projects to MFIs.7 
                                                   
7  As at January 2010. Full operations for JASMINE expected from Q3 2010. 
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Technical assistance aims to establish European best practises on issues such as governance, information 
and risk management systems, planning, funding and profitability. In addition technical assistance seeks 
to widen the use of credit ratings for selected MFIs and a partnership with two specialised microfinance 
rating agencies has been established for this purpose.  
The CIP also provides direct guarantees and counter-guarantees for micr finance. As discussed 
for guarantees earlier, this is managed by the EIF through risk sharing with funded institutions. 
 
BOX 5 
JASMINE EXAMPLE: COOPEST 
• Established microfinance funder with 17 MFIs in operation in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania & Kosovo 
• Executed in September 2009 
• Increase in funding from E15m to E30m with EIF providing E1.8m commitment 
• Joint support from EIF, IFC & umbrella of other EU based funders with a matched funding requirement. 
Source: Authors elaboration based in EIB information. 
6. EU/EIB risk sharing finance facility 
The Risk Sharing Finance Facility (“RSFF”) is a Joint EU and EIB facility to finance research, 
technological development as well as demonstration and innovation investments in a project specific 
form. The credit risk is shared between the European Commission and the EIB, thus increasing the 
ability of the EIB to lend funds. The RSFF has E2bn of capital with E1bn from the EIB and E1bn from 
the EC and a lending capacity of E10bn. E6bn has already been committed to a broad range of 
companies both in relation to sector, size and regions with an emphasis in clean technology.  
The facility is for multiple eligible bodies including SMEs and including companies that are 
unrated, unlisted or have lower credit ratings than the usual EIB standard. Debt-based financing includes 
loan or guarantee forms, including mezzanine. Financing is done both directly, in conjunction with other 
investors, or via guarantees to intermediaries.  
7. Credit and market risk management 
Both the EIB and the EIF hold an AAA credit rating and enjoy the MDB status under Basel II, allowing 
their assets to be zero-risk weighted for calculating capital requirements. Funding costs are consequently 
low, and these are passed on to end users.  
However the central activity of lending and investing in SMEs is inherently risky. The 
fundamental business and financial risk of SMEs themselves are rel tively high. This is especially the 
case for investment in high risk start-ups (seed capital) and early st ge SMEs as well as projects such as 
technology research and development. In addition SMEs are also potentially subject to liquidity 
pressures in the current environment.  
As a stark illustration of the relative riskiness of the SME sector, during the crisis of 2008 and 
into 2009 there was significant deterioration in the EIF’s portfolio quality. EIF guaranteed loan 
portfolios and securitizations assets on negative outlook increased from 5% to 20% of total exposure 
from 2007 to 2009, whereas impairments in private equity portfoli s rose from 16% to 24% in the same 
period. In addition, from 2007 to 2009 E72m of impairment provisions were required. However no 
structures have actually failed and actual cash losses remained at negligible levels. See table 9 below for 
details of these figures.  
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TABLE 8 
“NEGATIVE OUTLOOK”, ASSET IMPAIRMENTS & RELATED PRO VISIONS EIF 2007 TO 2009 
 2007 2008 2009 
Guarantees and Securitizations “Negative Outlook” Credit Exposure 
(percentage of portfolio) 
5.0 14.0 20.0 
Provisions for Losses on Guarantees & Securitizations 9.5 8.6 56.7 
Guarantees and Securitization Defaulted Exposure (percentage of 
portfolio) 
0.1 0.1 0.1 
Impaired Private Equity Assets (Em) 65.3 91.6 101.3 
Impaired Assets % of EIF Private Equity Portfolio (percentage) 16.0 21.0 24.0 
Source: EIF Annual Report 2007, 2008 & 2009. 
 
The table summarise key data on portfolio quality in the guarantee, securitizations and private 
equity portfolios of the EIF from the onset of the financil crisis to 2009. All indicators indicate a 
significant deterioration including rising “negative outlook” credits and rising impairments in the equity 
investments. Reserves were made as the portfolio quality deteriora d and in 2009 the losses pushed the 
EIF into a net loss of E7 m for the year. Realised defaults, however, remain at very low levels at less 
than 1% throughout the periods.8 
For the purpose of this paper, it is important to understand he factors that allow the EIB Group to 
manage appropriately its risks in relation to SME lending. This is because effective risk management is a 
fundamental feature for a successful replication of the EU experience in supporting the SME sector in 
developing countries, such as in LAC. 
Firstly risks are managed by an independent Risk Management and Mo itoring Department 
through approach of limiting exposures. The EIB and EIF are also selective in choosing SMEs including 
a policy of only supporting strong and growth-oriented SMEs. However, they do support start ups, 
unlike for example some LAC national development banks, like the Banco del Estado, which only 
finances SMEs that are already well established. The internal risk management also carefully balances 
the higher risk venture capital and equity investments with lower risk guarantees and debt financing and 
maintains high levels of portfolio diversification across intermediaries, SMEs and countries.  
Secondly some exposures are backed by EC or individual member count y g arantees and overall 
the EIB Group enjoys support from its highly-rated (at least until early 2010) member country 
shareholders. These ensure that the EIB and EIF are well supported financially through paid in and 
subscribed capital, and politically, given the importance of the EIB Group for the achievement of the EU 
policy goals. The EIB Groups also continue to maintain a strong capital base with high capital ratios and 
doubled authorised capital in 2007. 
However although EIFs risk management is highly prudent, it could be criticised as being 
excessively prudent and being insufficiently leverag d resulting in a lowered level of total financing to 
SMEs. For example a number of practises may be excessively prudent such as the very high level of 
guarantees vs. Equity. However, in the light of thefinancial crisis, prudence and conservatism in risk
management including limitation on leveraged financi l risk can be considered an important virtue as well. 
                                                   
8  The Chief Executive of the EIF, Richard Pelly, comments in the Annual Report 2009 that “The continued d terioration of the 
economic conditions for SMEs resulted in downgrades ... particularly on guarantee exposures, ... this represents a prudent level of 
provisioning .. none of the structures have failed an no actual cash losses were incurred in the year”.   
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III. Detailed discussion of 
policy recommendations 
As noted in the introduction and detailed in the above section, the EIB and 
EIF have extensive experience in SME financing. However, much of these 
practises in the SME sector have been developed in the economic and 
political context of the EU and EU candidate countries. Furthermore, 
several of the mechanisms described receive implicit or explicit support 
from the EU budget resources. Neither such institutions nor these 
resources are available in the LAC context. Therefore, if applied such
mechanisms would have to rely mainly on national budgets. In the next 
section we will discuss EIB Group practices, their relationship to the EU 
context, their applicability to the LAC context and the adjustments and/or 
selections which might be appropriate.  
1. Countercyclical policy approach 
As discussed in detail above, the counter cyclical policy of the EIB Group 
was strong and we would recommend application of it in the LAC context. 
This is especially the case as both SMEs and developing countries hav  
significant procyclical private sector capital flows and domestic finance. 
SMEs suffer disproportionally in periods of capital droughts as large 
corporates crowd out SMEs from domestic markets because access to 
international corporate markets becomes restricted. Of course to an 
important extent, the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) and 
national development banks have in LAC increased their lending during 
the crisis to counteract the fall in private lending (for the former see 
Griffith-Jones and Ocampo et al, 2010). 
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Furthermore, in countries, like Brazil, where national development ba ks account for a large 
proportion of total credit this public response was far more effective in lifting total credit than in 
countries where the role of public development banks had been reduced. So a lesson here seems to be 
that this is one important reason why the scale of public developm nt lending should be large - to 
facilitate greater impact of counter-cyclical lending in recessions and crises. Of course to this 
countercyclical reason, we need to add market gaps and imperfections in fi ancial markets, especially 
but not only for lending to SMEs, which justify clearly the need for public banks. 
Active consideration of these factors in policy making will ensure that the financing to SMEs are 
counter-cyclical, providing funds when they are most scarce and ensuring long term stable financing 
which bridges short term shortages. This should include automatically building capital “buffers” into 
capital approval to allow rapid expansion of lending during crisis periods without the need to seek 
approvals. Such crisis planning could be a critical part of a counter -cyclical policy approach for both 
regional and even national development banks.  
2. Financial structuring recommendations 
2.1 Role of guarantees 
As discussed, a large proportion of the EIB Group support for SMEs is in the form of guarantees 
provided by the EIF. We would suggest that guarantees hold significant advantages vis-à-vis other 
instruments and should be the main policy instrument to be implemented. Key advantages include their 
less complex risk profile, relative to equity or mezzanine, and anti-cyclical nature. When combined with 
two key features of the EIB approach, namely risk-sharing and an incremental lending requirement 
(especially clear in the CIP guarantee mechanism described above), this instrument would further ensure 
crowding in of the private sector and avoidance of moral hazard. 
Guarantees are also instruments that can be used to achieve low end user funding costs easily and 
ensure that the cost advantage is on-lent to the end user as the cost r duction can be reflected in the 
guarantee fees (including if there is no fee)and the end user lending rate easily monitored. As noted 
earlier, the problem of high cost of financing to SMEs is particularly important in the LAC context. For 
guarantees to be most effective in reducing costs, budgetary support for covering relatively small part of 
expected losses are valuable. This would allow, for example, the provision of guarantees to financial 
intermediaries free of charge in exchange for stricter requirements, such as incremental lending and 
passing on lower costs of funding.  
A further advantage is that, whilst creating contingent liabilities, the instrument is relatively 
simple to risk manage and execute once appropriate capacity is built. Risk management for guarantees 
require a special focus on screening and monitoring capacity of financial intermediaries as well as on 
their track record with SME portfolios. This can easily be built upon those risk management systems that 
are already in use within most MDBs and RDBs for their lending portfolios, which usually rely on 
thorough credit assessments of partner banks. Broadly, this expertise should also be available within 
national development banks. Nevertheless, it may be very useful for institutions like the EIF to organize 
or be invited to seminars with national development banks in the LAC region to discuss their risk 
management practices, the problems they have encountered, and how they have overcome them. Such 
sharing of experiences would seem very valuable. ECLAC could play a key role in organizing such 
meetings, possibly jointly with institutions like the CAF or the IADB, institutions which could present 
their own experience as well. 
2.2 Role of equity and securitization 
Using guarantees as a principle instrument would mean that relative to the EIB Group more complex 
products such as securitization or equity investments (Including venture capital) would be de-
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emphasised. The advantage is that this approach would avoid both the more complex and highly 
leveraged risk relating to them and the procyclical impact of suchhigh leverage. 
Securitization has historically been used by the EIB Group in SME financing through the EIF 
offering credit enhancement for mezzanine, junior and senior tranches of SME securitizations. The EIF 
had E2.7bn of outstanding commitments as at March 2010. The EIF credit enhancement offers 
significant advantages as it enables counterparties that otherwise would not have an adequate credit 
rating to transact a securitization and hence recycle funds into new SME financing. The approach has 
been particularly effective as enablers for smaller national regional financial institutions. In addition it 
provides other advantages such as regulatory capital relief and development of capital markets.  
 
BOX 6 
APPLYING SECURITIZATION TECHNIQUES IN DEVELOPING EC ONOMIES 
Securitization has historically been used by the EIB in SME financing through the EIF offering credit enhancement 
for mezzanine, junior and senior tranches of securitizations. The EIF has E2.7bn of outstanding commitments as at 
March 2010. It offers significant advantages as it enables counterparties that otherwise would not have an adequate 
credit rating to transact a securitization and hence recycle funds into new SME financing. The approach has been 
particularly effective as an enablers for smaller national regional financial institutions. In addition it provides other 
advantages such as regulatory capital relief and development of capital markets.  
However securitisation also has major factors that require consideration in assessing whether and to what extend 
this approach should be replicated in LAC. 
Firstly, the financial crisis highlighted the systematic problem that can arise from financial structuring including 
securitization. This includes a creation of an agent-principal problem and a lack of transparency in the financial system. 
In developing countries where financial markets often have impaired or lack both transparency and liquidity, even 
outside of crisis periods, these issues are important considerations due to the fragility of the financial system. The crisis 
has also curtailed severely investor appetite making issuance difficult and this asymmetric investor interest is again 
especially acute for both the SME market and for emerging markets. Since 2008 no SME securitizations have been 
completed in the market (although the EIF has one in the pipeline planned but not executed for 2010). 
Secondly, internally appropriate Risk Management is essential. Specialist staff & technology is a requirement. And 
even with the “best practise” risk management, losses can be sustained due to innate risk implicit in such products. The 
EIF itself sustained E54m of impairment losses in 2009 for example.  
Valuation and risk management market practise also use “mark-to-model” techniques which rely heavily on 
statistical models using, typically, historical data relating to portfolio performance. For examples the EIF techniques 
require extensive historical data on recovery and default rates for SMEs in the relevant geographical markets. 
Significant concerns exist in the commercial market relating to the validity of these models including their reliance on 
historical, rather than predictive future, data. In addition such data is largely unavailable or unreliable for developing 
countries meaning that the reliance than can be based on the model is further undermined. These issues are especially 
relevant for the EIB because they based the use of funds in the CIP program in estimates of expected loses which rely 
on both the model and data to be valid . 
Source: Authors elaboration based in EIB information. 
 
Similarly equity investments have played a critical role in the EIF policy especially in providing 
funding to early stage SMEs and in sectors such as high-tech due to limited capital available in the private 
sector for such high risk ventures. However such investments also have a higher failure rate and are 
speculative in their nature and as such a cautious approach needs to be taken to committing funds to them. 
Nevertheless, these instrument have important roles to play within the EIB Group policy in either 
crowding in private sector capital, such as using securitizations to release funds for reinvestment, or by 
closing market gaps, such as either providing directly venture capital funds or providing more higher 
leverage instruments in the form of equity or mezzanine debt which can contribute to finance start up 
and research and development projects. 
We would therefore recommend that these instruments are included within policy in LAC, but 
only for very selective instances where their advantages clearly outweigh their disadvantages. A key 
consideration in assessing this balance is that such a selective introduction of these mechanisms are also 
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most appropriate only for countries with deeper financial markets which mitigate concerns relating to the 
systematic impact of these instruments. 
BOX 7 
PARTNERING WITH VENTURE CAPITAL PARTNERS IN DEVELOP ING COUNTRIES 
One of the conduits used by the EIF to finance SMEs has been co-financing of venture capital funds. A typical 
financing is where the EIF co-invests as a minority partner in a fund which specialises in high technology of innovative 
SME investments in a dedicated region or sector. 
The technique has the advantage of crowding in the private sector into a field where financing is scarce. In addition 
the investments provide a potential upside gain, especially when made in the form of equity.  
However we note that the business model of many VC funds is to fund investments with a predetermined exit 
strategy and timeframe in order to realise a significant capital gain. In addition such funds are under a legal obligation 
to act in the interests of investors not SMEs and during period of crisis may have obligations to liquidate investment to 
fund investor’s withdrawals. A number of such funds made significant “fire sale” liquidations during the financial crisis 
when investors withdrew capital from high risk vehicles. 
The EIF-style arrangement of being a minority shareholder has relatively limited control over decision making over 
such withdraw or liquidations.  
In assessing whether to replicate these type of partnerships in Latin America we note the advantage of crowding 
into an important market gap. However we would emphasise that high degree of caution would be prudent in both 
assessing their degree of control over decision-making especially on exiting and liquidation and that an essential 
component of such partnerships is the reputation and reliability of funds to “stay the course” during difficulties with both 
individual investments and during crisis periods. 
Source: Authors elaboration based in EIB information. 
 
2.3 Partnering: co-financing and intermediaries 
As discussed, the EIB Group focuses on financial intermediaries for all SME financing. This includes a 
broad spectrum of intermediaries including banking institutions, non-banking financial institutions (e.g. 
leasing companies), venture capitalist and a variety of forms of capital market participations including 
securitizations. This approach carries significant advantage, most i portantly crowding in of the private 
sector and risk sharing, the latter reducing any moral hazard issues with intermediaries dealing with end 
user SMEs. We strongly recommend that this approach should be replicated or continue to be used in 
order to benefit from these advantages. In fact, institutions like the IADB use this indirect approach 
when serving SMEs in LAC. 
In addition, use of intermediaries has significant operational advantages including the ability to 
scale the financing of SMEs as the approach allows the networks of branches, operational frameworks 
and local accumulated knowledge of intermediaries to be used to both access, assess and monitor the end 
user SMEs. We would in fact consider that for achieving scale across a region to a material number of 
end users, this is probably the only practical approach. It is important that the intermediaries chosen 
cover a large range of SME activities and regions. 
However, the approach also entails placing significant reliance on intermediaries’ operational 
soundness and reliability. Consequently the approach also requires careful selection and screening of 
intermediaries, and a dedicated risk management framework in place.  
In relation to the type of intermediaries we would suggest that, given the relatively immature state 
of the capital market sector and the currently well established banking sector engagement in SMEs, the 
policy approach should focus to a great extent on currently well established banking institutions in 
relevant countries.  
We consider that possibly a more conservative approach should be taken towards other potential 
partners including private sector venture capitalists. One of the key issues in considering any venture 
capital partner should be the stability of their commitment to the investment which should indicate a 
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significant fixed time period. Indeed, maybe even minimal periods f commitment could be required. 
See box 7 for further discussion of these points.  
The EIB Group usually prefer to select intermediaries with whom they already have an 
established relationship and with whom they consider competence and r liability is established. The EIB 
Group also undertakes an assessment of the internal control and perations of the intermediary including 
detailed assessment of their competence in evaluating and monitoring he end user SME credit risk, 
accounting processes and similar internal controls. We would again recommend replication of both the 
selection of known intermediaries and replication of detailed internal assessments of their control 
environment and operational competence. Some of the criteria that could be used to assess 
intermediaries would include internal risk management control, accur y and timeliness of reporting and 
accounting, reputation and track record of SME financing, extent and depth of local presence and 
knowledge and clarity of commitment to the country and sector.  
Although the extent of these selection criteria is high we do believe that it would be possible to 
identify sufficient intermediaries to achieve scale across LAC. In particular many LAC countries have 
very well established national banking institutions with nationwide networks and strong reputations. 
Such institutions would make strong candidates for intermediari s and excellent example of similar 
partnership have already been executed by such institutions as the IADB and some national development 
banks tend to use financial intermediaries for such purposes (“Bancos de Segundo Piso”) 
Finally, but importantly, we would reemphasise the EIB Group requirement for guarantees to crowd 
in using an incremental lending condition. As noted, guarantees are only given above an assessed “normal” 
level of lending for a given intermediary thus ensuring the EIB Group crowding in incremental lending 
from the private sector. We recommend that this approach should be replicated in the LAC context. 
As described in Box 8, the EIB Group guarantee experience is being adapted by the African 
Development Bank to establish a regional guarantee fund . This is a valuable experience in itself, and 
also shows a concrete example of how the EIB Group experiences can be successfully transferred to 
developing and emerging countries. 
2.4 Use of legal entity structures 
As discussed in Part II, the EIB Group executes SME financing through a range of structures. In addition o 
the EIB and the EIF, these also include complex legal structures such as holding funds and SPVs as well as 
securitization-related SPVs and segregated funds of funds. In assessing these structures it can be 
commented that the creation and operation of them is resource intensive both in terms of the expertise to 
create the required legal entities support as well as operational complexity on an ongoing basis. 
For the EIB Group these negatives are worthwhile as the drivers for them are strong. For example 
many of the structures within the EIF umbrella relate to EU funds that are committed to specific 
purposes and thus require segregation and separate management. An example of this is JEREMIE where 
EU structural funds of specific amounts and for a specific country are committed and the holding fund is 
then created to manage this appropriately. Similarly JASMINE is funded from the RCM and again a 
separate holding and management fund is required to implement and manage this. Finally SPVs may be 
created for specific transactions, such as securitization vehicles. 
However we would consider that most of these rationales are quite specific to the EIB Group and 
would recommend simplification of legal structures that are expensive and resource intensive to 
maintain, unless a clear rational can be identified.  
This may include, for example, use of similar legal entity segregation to create funding that 
benefits from a AAA status for institutions like the IADB, or allows national or sub regional 
development banks to maintain their existing rating, whilst incurring more risk for lending to SMES and 
microfinance. Where budget support or grants are made available, it se ms important to make these and 
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their use as explicit as possible. In fact, it could be argued that the budget resources that, in the European 
context, are provided to the EIB/EIF could be more transparently presented. 
In box 8, we can see an interesting experience by the AfDB in applying the EIF model to a developing 
country context, which one of the authors of this study has played an important role in designing. 
BOX 8 
AN EXAMPLE: THE AFDB REGIONAL GUARANTEE FUNDS FOR S ME FINANCING 
An interesting example of where the EIB Group practises have been successfully adapted to a developing country 
context is the African Guarantee Fund (AGF) being established by the AfDB and partner donors.  
The AGF concept is largely inspired by the successful experience of the EIF in particular as a specialized 
guarantee provider for easing SME access to finance. The AGF’s business model is based on the principle of risk-
sharing with financial intermediaries and crowding in of private financing.  
The AGF will be a newly established international financial institution, and will provide loan portfolio and portable 
guarantees to financial institutions, complemented by technical assistance for both partner banks and SMEs. Funding 
will be initially provided by the AfDB along with the Danish and the Spanish governments, with other donors and 
investors to join at a later stage. The expected high credit rating of the AGF will entail capital relief for partner banks, 
thus rising incentives in joining the scheme. 
As well as replicating while adapting the EIB Group experience with SMEs, we also note that this is an example 
where the use of a complex SPV is justified as it provides a segregated vehicle to clarify the combination of donor and 
MDB funds, with a relatively simple framework for monitoring additionality and development outcomes at the same time 
ensuring transparency in the use of public money. 
Source: Authors elaboration based in EIB information. 
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IV. Conclusions and policy 
implications of EIB experience 
1. Tailoring to the financial markets for 
SMEs in developing countries 
As noted in the above discussion relating to the EIB Group engagement with 
SMEs, the majority of its activity is in the high-income countries of the EU. 
However in considering applying this experience into developing countries we 
need to consider important differences in the enviro ment that may affect the 
preferred approach. 
1.1 Tailoring of guarantee program 
Firstly SMEs in developing countries are almost exclusively financed 
through banks, as opposed to capital markets.9 This has been found to be 
especially the case for the LAC region according to the World Bank L tin 
America Regional Study on SME Finance in 2007.10 The survey also 
completed a cross-country comparison of banking fees and interest rat  
and found that, on average, developing countries fees and interest rates are 
higher. In addition the level of lending to SMEs, as measured by the level 
of lending to SMEs as a percentage of bank total lending, was lower. 
These points illustrate the barriers to financing experienced by developing 
countrySMEs.  
 
                                                   
9  See Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maskkimovic 2008. 
10  As well as World Bank country surveys for Argentina & Chile, subjects of the initial survey, and Colombia in 2008.  
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In relation to these differences for financial markets for SMEs we would suggest that the EIB 
approach may need to be adjusted in LAC. In particular we would place a greater emphasis on lending 
via banking intermediaries and a high emphasis on the policy goal of reducing costs of financing as well 
as improving absolute access.  
We also suggest additional approaches to facilitating an anti-cyclical policy to compensate for 
private capital flows in bad times and increase the “stickiness” of private sector capital crowded in. For 
example, it may be possible to include as a requirement for guarantees a committed maturity for lending 
or to limit exit conditions or net portfolio reductions across fixed time periods.11 Although this is 
unlikely to be preferred by intermediaries due to the restrictions on them that it imposes, such a 
condition would be very useful in terms of stabilising lending to SMEs. 
We would also recommend flexibility around the RDB and SRDB (sub regional development 
bank) participation levels in co-financing arrangements so that RDBs can provide an anti-cyclical role to 
fill any gaps in financing that occur on the downside of business cycles. This is what the EIB Group has 
in fact done quite impressively in the current crisis. 
1.2 Replacing the eu subsidies in the eib programs 
As discussed, the EIB and EIF receive funding from the EC. In particular the CIP program provides funds 
which cover expected losses on guarantees thus facilitating the implementation of guarantees programs by 
reducing costs, extending access to riskier SMEs and expanding maturities. In addition, EIB lending 
benefits from the support provided by creditworthy EU member countries, ensuring financing at longer 
maturities to emerging (pre-accession) economies, and at cheaper rates in EU countries. 
We would recommend detailed consideration of how budget resources could be generated, 
channelled best and used most productively to improve SME access to financing as a replacement for the 
EU based capital and budgetary support that underlies several of the most successful activities to support 
SMEs by the EIB group such as CIP. For example it may be possible to use grants or ODA to facilitate 
such a guarantee program in low income countries in LAC. This would also have the advantage of 
potentially enabling significant leverage of donor funds. As noted, the EIB achieved fifteen time 
leverage, and this advantage is particularly attractive in the current environment where “doing less with 
more” is being emphasised at many IFIs.  
For LAC middle income countries, which practically receive no grants from donors, such 
resources would have to come from national budgets. It seems important that the need to provide budget 
resources to support lending to SMEs (clearly for specific and accountable purposes) is explicitly 
recognized and implemented. Naturally, such resources should be transpa ently used, clearly targeted 
and limited. To avoid the private financial sector free riding o the subsidies without passing on the 
benefits to SMEs, clear rules should be introduced and enforced. As mentioned, for example the CIP 
requires and monitors that subsidized guarantees deliver additionality of lending. The EIB lending to 
SMEs via intermediaries requires the latter to report how they have passed on the financial advantage 
from EIB funds to SMEs. Similar mechanisms would need to be introduced in LAC. 
1.3 Assessing demand and scope of coverage 
A key issue in designing institutional mechanisms for additional SME financing is more precise 
quantitative of the demand-side analysis. This area is one that is being increasingly considered by a 
number of key IFIs and similar bodies including the World Bank. Typical approaches to data collection 
include firm-level surveys and further analysis of supply data. Overall results indicate that access to 
finance is reported as one of the top issues for SMEs12 and that lack of finance is negatively correlated 
with SME growth. For Latin America specifically, a World Bank survey of “top concerns for firms” 
                                                   
11  Most relevant for venture capital funds which usually select investments with an “exit strategy” and where their fund requirements 
may allow investors in funds structures etc to withdraw driving their requirements to withdraw capital etc.  
12  Source: World Bank. “Access to finance” is ranked 3r key constraint globally. 
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ranked “access to finance” as the third most important concern for entrepreneurs.13 The appendix 
includes ranking by individual country within the region from this survey.  
However, although current data on demand side constraints is valuable, existing data could be 
improved further to assist appropriate policy design. Data collection efforts are being scaled up and 
include efforts to centralize the collection of supply-data by central banks and regulators as well as 
demand-based surveys to quantify SME financing needs. Informati n is also being expanded to cover all 
aspects of SME business and market development including age and size, to allow policymakers to tailor 
policy responses (see figure 4).  
In this regard, a number of initiatives are being taken at national as well as global level to improve 
information and support in these areas. This includes the recently formed G-20 Financial Inclusion 
Experts Group,14 who are recommending an action plan for a comprehensive data collection ffort for 
SMEs, and the EU, who are undertaking a number of intra-European Community initiatives. The later 
include the Enterprise Finance Index with extensive data collection, SME surveys on a six monthly basis 
by the EIB and a bi-annual survey covering SME financing across all 27 EU countries plus Croatia, 
Iceland and Norway. 
In relation to Latin America and the Caribbean, we would recommend that CEPAL and the IADB 
both seek to engage in these global initiatives and to quantity more exactly demand constraints within 
the region. We welcome that CEPAL has recently commissioned a major survey of SMEs within Central 
America as an example of appropriate initiatives of this type.  
Another option to consider is replicating the assessment studie  completed by the EIF as part of 
the JEREMIE project. This included a detailed assessment of the relevant national or regional SME 
market, comprising supply and demand factors, a gap analysis and an evaluation of other financing 
issues. This allows tailoring of policy to the circumstances of an individual country.  
1.4 Microenterprises and financing 
In addition, in many developing countries, there is typically  greater level of well established 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) which act as key enablers for micro-entrepreneurship and contributing 
to poverty alleviation, a key MDG. This is particularly true of LAC where many countries, including low 
income countries, have well developed microfinance institutions.  
Although it has recently developed the JASMINE program, the EIB Group, has not been very 
active in the microfinance sector. In fact it is interesting that a major microfinance mechanism being 
launched at the EIB is largely inspired on developing country experience, a case of reverse transfer! In 
relation to this, we would recommend coverage of the full spectrum of SMEs including micro-
entrepreneurs in LAC, and that the partners and intermediaries are xtended to MFIs. We would note, 
however, that such MFIs should be carefully chosen to include well-established and larger, ideally 
national, organizations and that for small MFIs may not always be appropriate due to limitations in their 
scale and internal soundness.  
 
                                                   
13  Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey 2006. Firms in Latin America rated “access to finance” as their 3rd after “political stability” 
and “practises in informal finance”. Details for ind vidual countries are given in the Appendix as rankings within Latin America 
vary by country.  
14  Author, Pietro Calice, is a member of this G20 Expert Group who provided comment based on current discussions within the group. 
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FIGURE 5 
EIB CONCEPTUAL THINKING OF THE VARIOUS STAGES OF AN  SME AND 
RELATED POLICY INSTRUMENTS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE F OR THAT STAGE. 














Source: Authors elaboration. 
 
 
1.5 Support of technical innovation 
As discussed, the EIB Group acts to support high-tech SMEs and develop the broader high-tech sector 
through private partnerships with key universities and ventur  capitalists. However in many LAC 
countries there is a gap between demand for such financing and the supply of venture capital financing 
from the private sector, including that linked to universitie . 
We would recommend a policy approach to innovation and technology through alternative 
policies such as public support of clustering, technological research and commercialization of innovation 
by government agencies rather than private sector agents. Such an approach could ensure a closure of 
this gap and accelerate both technical innovation and technology transfer. The models used by the EIB 
and EIF can offer valuable precedents. 
1.6 Extending technical advise 
As noted the EIB Group includes technical advice as a key component f some of its programs. In 
particular JEREMIE seeks to ensure technical advice is provided to assist in the success rates of SMEs. 
Given the limited environment in many developing countries for business experience we would 
recommend that all programs include technical advice, where required, as a key accompanying 
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Appendix 1 
Corporate demand side data for key Latin American 
& Caribbean countries 
 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey, showing ranking of “T p Concerns of Firms”. Year of data for 
each country varies and is shown in parentheses.  
As can be seen the ranking of “access to finance” varies by country bt is generally ranked as 3rd 
or 4th. However for some countries other factors are more important including informal sector practises, 
tax rates and political instability. Highest ranking for “Access to finance” is in Argentina and Nicaragua 
(Both 2nd) and the lowest in Venezuela (Unranked), Chile (6th)and Columbia (5th). 
 
TABLE A1 
ARGENTINA (2006)  
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Brazil Latin America & Caribbean
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Nicaragua Latin America & Caribbean






















































































































































































































































































Uruguay Latin America & Caribbean
CEPAL - Serie Financiamiento del desarrollo No 236 The European Investment Bank and SMEs… 
47 
TABLE A10 
REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA (2006) 


















































































































































Venezuela Latin America & Caribbean





CIP   Competitiveness & Innovation Framework Program 
EIB   European Investment Bank 
EIF   European Investment Fund 
EC   European Commission 
EU   European Union 
GIF   High Growth and Innovative SME Facility 
IADB   Inter-American Development Bank 
JEREMIE Joint European Resources for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
JASMINE Joint Action to Support Microfinance Institutions in Europe 
LAC   Latin America and the Caribbean 
LIC   Low Income Countries 
MDB   Multilateral Development Bank 
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals 
MIC   Middle Income Countries 
RCM   Risk Capital Mandate 
RDB   Regional Development Bank 
SME   Small and Medium-sized Enterprise 
SMEGF  Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Guarantee Facility 
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